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In August 2007, seventeen-month-old1 Andrew was abducted 
to Mexico from his hometown of Milwaukee, Wisconsin.2  At the 
time of his abduction, Andrew’s parents were involved in divorce 
proceedings and had a temporary custody agreement granting 
                                                 
1   Sources differ as to whether Andrew was seventeen or nineteen 
months old at the time of his abduction.  Compare Trevor Richardson, My Journey 
Continues (Mar. 1, 2008), 
http://mexicoabduction.blogspot.com/2008_03_01_archive.html (Trevor’s blog 
stating that Andrew was seventeen months old at the time of his abduction), with 
Trevor Richardson, Bring Andrew Home-Int’l Child Abduction to Mexico, YOUTUBE 
(Sep. 7, 2010) [hereinafter Bring Andrew Home], 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bl_SJ1CVOdM (A news segment posted on 
Trevor’s YouTube channel stating that Andrew was nineteen months old).  
2   Felony Warrant For Mother Who Abducted Her Child, Andrew Richardson, In 
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Andrew’s father, Trevor, visitation.3  When Trevor arrived at 
Andrew’s daycare to pick him up, he was informed that his son had 
not shown up for a week.4  Andrew was soon found in Querétaro, 
Mexico, living with his mother, Mariana,5 a Mexican national.6  
Mariana was charged in the U.S. with two felonies for abduction,7 
and Trevor was granted sole legal custody of Andrew.8  Upon 
arriving in Mexico, however, Mariana had told authorities that she 
fled the U.S. because Trevor was abusive to her and Andrew.9  
Although the U.S. determined these allegations were false,10 Trevor 
remains unable to secure the return of his son to the U.S. in 
accordance with his custody rights.11 
Sadly, Andrew and Trevor’s story is not uncommon.  Each 
year, more than one thousand international parental child abductions 
from the U.S. to other countries are reported.12  Since 2006, Congress 
has reported that this number has “increased substantially,”13 since 
advancements in international transportation and communication 
have resulted in an increase in travel and immigration.14  In fact, it is 
estimated that more than 11,000 American children15 currently live 
                                                 
3   Trevor Richardson, History, BRING ANDREW HOME, 
http://www.bringandrewhome.com/andrew_feb_7_002.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 
2014). 
4   Id. 
5   Id. 
6   Bring Andrew Home, supra note 1. 
7   Id. 
8   My Journey Continues, supra note 1. 
9   Bring Andrew Home, supra note 1. 
10   Id. 
11   My Journey Continues, supra note 1. 
12   H.R. 3212, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013), available at 
http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th/house-bill/3212/text. 
13   H.R. 1951, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013), available at 
http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th/house-bill/1951/text; see also H.R. 3240, 
111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/F?c111:1:./temp/~c111TqDdHb:e1569: (stating that the number of 
international parental child abductions increased by sixty percent from 2006 to 
2008, and by forty percent in 2008 alone). 
14   Priscilla Steward, Access Rights: A Necessary Corollary to Custody Rights 
Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Int’l Child Abduction, 21 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 308, 315 (1997). 
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abroad as a result of international parental child abduction.16  
Statistically, only half of these children will be returned to the U.S.17 
International parental child abduction frequently causes 
severe psychological and emotional damage to both the child and 
left-behind parent.18  Often, the child is taken from a stable, healthy 
environment, and relocated to an unfamiliar environment in which he 
or she must meet new people, learn a new language, and understand 
and assimilate into a different culture.19  Worse still, taking parents 
sometimes force their children to alter their appearance or change 
their name,20 and may tell their children the left-behind parent is 
dead, does not want them, or is not trying to get them back.21  
Abducted children often experience “anxiety, eating problems, 
nightmares, mood swings, sleep disturbances, aggressive behavior, 
resentment, and fearfulness,” and these problems may persist 
through adulthood.22 
                                                 
15   Another source estimated that there are more than 200,000 cases of 
international child abduction per year, which would significantly increase the 
number of American children who are believed to be living abroad as a result of 
international parental child abduction.  A Parent’s Worst Nightmare: The Heartbreak of 
Int’l Child Abduction: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 108th Cong. 110 
(2004) (statement of the Hon. Dennis DeConcini, Chairman of the Board, National 
Center for Missing & Exploited Children), available at 
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa94505.000/hfa94505_0f.htm. 
16   Michael Walsh & Susan Savard, Int’l Child Abduction and the Hague 
Convention, 6 BARRY L. REV. 29, 29 (2006). 
17   H.R. 3212, supra note 12. 
18   U.S. Dep’t of State, Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention on the 
Civil Aspects of Int’l Child Abduction 10 (Apr. 2010) [hereinafter 2010 Compliance 
Report], available at 
http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/childabduction/complianceReports/2010Co
mplianceReport.pdf. 
19   Caitlin Bannon, The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction: The Need for Mechanisms to Address Noncompliance, 31 B.C. THIRD 
WORLD L.J. 129, 134 (2011). 
20   U.S. Dep’t of State, Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention on the 




21   Id. 
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Similarly, left-behind parents frequently experience 
psychological, emotional, and financial problems while attempting to 
secure the return of their children.23  Left-behind parents often feel 
“helplessness and the sense they do not know where to start in the 
process of recovering their child.”24  A lack of financial resources 
exacerbates these emotions, since the left-behind parent may be 
restricted in traveling abroad, retaining an attorney, hiring translators 
and interpreters, and proceeding with the case.25 
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction (the “Hague Convention” or the “Convention”) 
was enacted to ensure that victims of international parental child 
abduction are returned to their custodial parent.26  The text of the 
Convention, however, does not set forth standards or procedures to 
implement the Convention.27  Consequently, many countries have 
failed to comply because of internal difficulties with enforcement.28 
This comment will examine the problem of noncompliance, 
with a focus on children abducted between the U.S. and Mexico.  
Part II provides a general overview of the Convention and examines 
its objectives and operation between contracting states.  Part III 
assesses the problems of the Convention, particularly its lack of an 
enforcement mechanism.  Part IV describes the differences between 
the U.S. and Mexico’s legal systems, with an emphasis on custody 
rights.  Part V explains the history of the Convention in the U.S. and 
Mexico, focuses on each country’s compliance efforts, and provides 
an overview of recent compliance efforts in Latin America.  Finally, 
Part VI explores potential solutions for addressing noncompliance, 
including creating Hague Convention courts and providing adequate 
resources to left-behind parents and Central Authorities. 
                                                 
22   Id. 
23   2010 Compliance Report, supra note 18, at 11. 
24   2009 Compliance Report, supra note 20, at 7. 
25   Id. 
26   The Convention on the Civil Aspects of Int’l Child Abduction, opened 
for signature Oct. 25, 1980, 1343 U.N.T.S. 98 [hereinafter Abduction Convention], 
available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=24. 
27   Elisa Perez-Vera, Hague Conf. on Private Int’l Law, Explanatory 
Report 430 (1981) [hereinafter Perez-Vera Report], available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/expl28.pdf. 
28   Bannon, supra note 19, at 153. 
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II.  THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF 
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 
On October 24, 1980, twenty-nine Member States of the 
Hague Conference unanimously adopted the Convention, which was 
signed the following day.29  Currently, more than eighty countries are 
party to the Convention, including the U.S. and Mexico.30  The 
Convention’s primary goal is for countries to work together to 
“protect children internationally from the harmful effects of their 
wrongful removal or retention and to establish procedures to ensure 
their prompt return to the State of habitual residence31.”32  The 
Convention also seeks to ensure that rights of custody and access are 
returned to the “status quo” that existed before the child was 
abducted.33  Finally, the Convention seeks to deter abducting parents 
from engaging in international forum shopping to find a country in 
which they believe they can obtain a favorable custody agreement.34 
A. Objectives of the Hague Convention 
The Hague Convention states two primary objectives:35 (1) 
“to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or 
retained in any Contracting State,”36 and (2) “to ensure that rights of 
                                                 
29   Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 426. 
30   Members of the Organisation, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.statusprint&cid=24 (last 
visited Jan. 26, 2014), now available at 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=states.listing.  
31   Neither the Hague Convention nor ICARA define a child’s state of 
habitual residence.  In Abbott, however, the Supreme Court explained that a child’s 
state of habitual residence is “fixed by the custody arrangement,” so the child 
should be returned to the country of his or her custodial parent.  Abbott v. Abbott, 
560 U.S. 1, 33 (2010). 
32   Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at Preamble. 
33   Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 429. 
34   Id.; Walsh & Savard, supra note 16, at 30. 
35   Both of the Convention’s objectives assume that the return of the 
child to the state of habitual residence is in his or her best interest.  Although the 
Convention does not explicitly refer to the child’s best interest, contracting states 
consider them to be of utmost importance when determining custody and access 
rights.  Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 431. 
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custody and access under the law of one Contracting State are 
effectively represented in the other Contracting States.”37  A taking 
parent’s duty to return a child is triggered only when the child’s 
removal or retention is deemed wrongful under the Convention.38  
Removal or retention is considered wrongful where it is (1) in breach 
of custody rights in the state in which the child was habitually 
resident immediately prior to his or her removal or retention, and (2) 
when the left-behind parent was actually exercising those custody 
rights at the time of the removal or retention.39 
The Convention defines custody rights as “relating to the care 
of . . . the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child’s 
place of residence.”40  Custody rights differ from access rights, which 
are the “rights to take a child for a limited period of time to a place 
other than the child’s habitual residence.”41  Custody rights may arise 
by law, or by a judicial or administrative decision or agreement that 
has legal effect under the law of the child’s state of habitual 
residence.42 
B. The Role of the Central Authority 
To execute the mandates of the Hague Convention, 
contracting states are required to assign a Central Authority.43  The 
primary role of the Central Authority is to return abducted children 
by encouraging cooperation between officials in each state and 
among other contracting states.44  In addition, Central Authorities 
must assist in locating the child, attempt to facilitate a voluntary 
return of the child, and, if necessary, initiate legal proceedings for the 
                                                 
36    A contracting state is “any country which is a party to the 
Convention.”  22 C.F.R. § 94.1 (2013). 
37     Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at art. 1. 
38     Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 444. 
39     Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at art. 3. 
40     Id. at art. 5(a). 
41     Id. at art. 5(b). 
42     Id. at art. 3. 
43     Id. at art. 6. 
44     Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at art. 7. 
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child’s return.45  In the U.S., the designated Central Authority is the 
Office of Children’s Issues within the U.S. Department of State.46  In 
Mexico, the Central Authority is the Secretaría de Relaciones 
Exteriores.47 
C. Filing a Hague Convention Application 
For assistance in returning an abducted child, left-behind 
parents who believe their child has been wrongfully removed or 
retained must apply to a Central Authority.48  The Central Authority 
then must act “without delay” to transmit the application to its 
pertinent counterpart Central Authority,49 which must “take[] all 
appropriate measures” to locate the child and secure his or her 
prompt return.50 
A left-behind parent must satisfy three threshold 
requirements before filing a valid Hague Convention application.  
First, the child’s country of habitual residence and country of 
abduction must both be signatories to the Convention.51  Second, the 
child must have been removed from the state of habitual residence in 
breach of custody or access rights authorized in that state.52  Third, 
the child must be younger than sixteen years of age.53  Even if the 
child is abducted or an application for the child’s return is initiated 
                                                 
45   Id.; Outline: Hague Child Abduction Convention, HAGUE CONF. ON 
PRIVATE INT’L LAW (July 2012), http://www.hcch.net/upload/outline28e.pdf. 
46   Authorities, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=authorities.details&aid=133 (last visited 
Jan. 26, 2014). 
47   Int’l Parental Child Abduction, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
http://travel.state.gov/content/childabduction/english/country/mexico.html (last 
visited Jan. 26, 2014). 
48   Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at art. 8; Perez-Vera Report, 
supra note 27, at 455 (stating that the applicant may apply to whichever Central 
Authority it deems most appropriate). 
49   Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at art. 9. 
50   Id. at art. 10. 
51   Id. at art. 35.  
52   Id. at art. 3. 
53   Id. at art. 4. 
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before the child turns sixteen years old, the Convention ceases to 
apply as soon as the child reaches this age.54 
If all three requirements are satisfied and the child is 
successfully located, the appropriate Central Authority must assist the 
left-behind parent to initiate court proceedings in the country in 
which the child is located.55  In these proceedings, the court should 
not consider the merits of the underlying custody dispute.56  Instead, 
the court’s sole focus is to determine whether the child was 
wrongfully removed according to custody rights in the child’s state of 
habitual residence and to return those children it determines to have 
been wrongfully removed.57  If the parents desire to modify their 
custody agreement, they must contact the appropriate authorities in 
the child’s state of habitual residence once the child has been 
returned.58 
D. Defenses to the Hague Convention 
To protect the child’s best interests, the Hague Convention 
does not require the prompt return of abducted children under five 
circumstances.59  First, there is no obligation to return a child if more 
than one year has elapsed from when the child was wrongfully 
removed or retained to when the left-behind parent made a request 
for the child’s return, as long as the child has settled in to his or her 
new environment.60  Second, there is no duty to return a child if the 
parent with custodial rights was not exercising those rights at the time 
of the child’s removal or retention.61  Third, if the left-behind parent 
consented or acquiesced in the child’s removal or retention, the 
                                                 
54   Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at art. 4. 
55   Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 455. 
56   Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at art. 16-19. 
57   Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 429. 
58   Id. at 430. 
59   The first three defenses listed must be proved by a preponderance of 
the evidence, and the last two must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.  
Nat’l Report Int’l Child Custody, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/childabduction/International_Child_Abducti
on_Remedies_Act.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2015). 
60   Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at art. 12. 
61   Id. at art. 13(a). 
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taking parent is not required to return the child.62  Fourth, there is no 
obligation to return a child if the abducting country determines that 
doing so would pose a “grave risk” or place the child in an otherwise 
“intolerable situation.”63  Finally, a taking parent is not required to 
return a child if doing so would go against the requesting state’s 
fundamental principles relating to the protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.64 
III. PROBLEMS OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION 
Prior to the Hague Convention, a left-behind parent would 
have little to no legal remedy to ensure his or her child’s rightful 
return.65  The Department of State could not enforce an American 
custody agreement outside of the U.S.,66 since custody rights 
authorized in the U.S. could not be enforced in other countries.67  In 
addition, courts in the U.S. were reluctant to enforce a left-behind 
parent’s custody rights, since the abducted child was no longer 
located within the U.S.68 
The Convention has not achieved its laudable goals.  The 
Convention was designed to ensure that wrongfully removed children 
would be returned in accordance with custody rights ordered in the 
child’s state of habitual residence (and effectively return the situation 
                                                 
62   Id. 
63   Id. at art. 13(b). 
64   Id. at art. 20. 
65   Tai Vivatvaraphol, Back to Basics: Determining a Child’s Habitual Residence 
in Int’l Child Abduction Cases Under the Hague Convention, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 3325, 
3332-33 (2009); see also Susan Mackie, Procedural Problems in the Adjudication of Int’l 
Parental child Abduction Cases, 10 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 445, 448 (1996) (stating 
that before the Convention, taking parents would obtain a favorable custody 
agreement in the abducting country, precluding the left-behind parent from 
establishing his or her custody rights). 
66   Int’l Child Abduction, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 1995), available at 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/population/children/9501.html. 
67   Vivatvaraphol, supra note 65, at 3332. 
68   Id. 
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to the “status quo”69); however, the Convention is not performing as 
it was originally intended.70 
The Convention’s primary issue is that its text does not 
contain an enforcement mechanism for “ensuring that Contracting 
States fulfill their obligations or for dealing with those Contracting 
States that fail to do so.”71  As a result, enforcement of the 
Convention hinges solely on the cooperation and willingness of 
contracting states.72  If contracting states do not comply, there are no 
consequences or repercussions.73  Left-behind parents report that 
even when their children are abducted to countries that are 
signatories to the Convention, most of these countries “routinely 
reject the responsibility that comes with participation in [the 
Convention]” and the U.S. “fail[s] to respond to their pleas for 
help.”74 
As a result of the lack of an enforcement mechanism, 
numerous parties to the Convention are considered noncompliant.75  
The International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA),76 enacted 
in the U.S. to enforce the Convention, requires the Department of 
State to release an annual compliance report.77  Reports include 
detailed country-by-country international child abduction statistics, 
summaries of unresolved cases, address issues contracting states are 
having with compliance, and describe efforts to encourage parties to 
the Convention to use nongovernmental organizations to assist left-
behind parents seeking the return of their children.78  Compliance 
                                                 
69   Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 429. 
70   Bannon, supra note 19, at 153. 
 
71   Id. 
72   Id. (quoting Paul R. Beaumont & Peter E. McEleavy, The Hague 
Convention on Int’l Child Abduction 242 (P.B. Carter ed., 1999). 
73   Id. 
74   H.R. Con. Res. 293, 106th Cong. (2000). 
75   Bannon, supra note 19, at 153. 
76   See discussion infra, at Part V.B. 
77   42 U.S.C. § 11611(a) (1988). 
78   Id. 
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reports also list all countries the Department of State determines are 
having difficulties enforcing the Convention.79 
When evaluating a contracting state’s compliance, the 
Department of State evaluates three areas: Central Authority 
performance, judicial performance, and law enforcement 
performance.80  First, the Department of State evaluates how quickly 
a country’s Central Authority processes Convention applications, its 
willingness to help left-behind parents find competent legal 
assistance, and its responsiveness to inquiries made by the U.S. 
Central Authority (USCA) and left-behind parents.81  Next, the 
Department evaluates judicial performance, including how quickly 
the country’s courts process Convention applications and appeals, 
whether the courts correctly apply the Convention’s legal procedures, 
and how effective courts are in enforcing decisions.82  Finally, the 
Department reviews law enforcement performance by examining 
whether law enforcement officials are successful in expeditiously 
locating abducted children and taking parents, and enforcing court 
orders issued under the Convention.83 
Based on contracting states’ performance, they may be 
labeled by the Department of State as either “Countries Not 
Compliant with the Convention” or “Countries Demonstrating 
Patterns of Noncompliance with the Convention.”84  A “Countr[y] 
Not Compliant with the Convention” designation signals the country 
is not competent in all performance areas.85  A “Countr[y] 
Demonstrating Patterns of Noncompliance” designation indicates 
the country is not competent in one or two of the three performance 
                                                 
79   Id. 
80   2009 Compliance Report, supra note 20, at 6. 
 
81   Id. at 12. 
82   Id. 
83   Id. 
84   U.S. Dep’t of State, Report on Compliant with the Hague Convention on the 




85   Id. 
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areas.86  Mexico has earned both of these designations in recent 
years.87  In addition, a country is considered compliant if it is 
competent in all three areas, although the Department of State 
considers even one unresolved case to possibly “reflect broader 
problems of concern with the country’s compliance.”88 
IV.  DIFFERENCES IN LEGAL SYSTEMS BETWEEN MEXICO AND THE 
U.S. 
Mexico and the U.S. possess different legal systems, and 
different philosophies regarding custody and parental rights.89  In 
deciding Hague Convention return cases, the law of the child’s state 
of habitual residence governs the validity of the claim.90  This law 
must be construed broadly to “embrac[e] both written and customary 
rules of law91 . . . and the interpretations placed upon them by case-
law.”92  This has led to misunderstandings in enforcing custody 
agreements, and makes it difficult for the U.S. and Mexico to 
uniformly enforce the Hague Convention.  Ultimately, this conflict 
contributes to the Department of State’s determination that Mexico 
is noncompliant.93 
                                                 
86   Id. 
87   See U.S. Dep’t of State, Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention on 
the Civil Aspects of Int’l Child Abduction 15 (Apr. 2007) [hereinafter 2007 Compliance 
Report], available at 
http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/childabduction/complianceReports/2007chil
d_abduction_Compliance_Report.pdf; 2008 Compliance Report, supra note 83, at 16; 
2009 Compliance Report, supra note 20, at 21; 2010 Compliance Report, supra note 18, at 
22. 
88   2010 Compliance Report, supra note 18, at 15. 
89   Mexico’s legal system derives from civil law, so judges look primarily 
at the Code when deciding legal issues.  The U.S.’ legal system derives from 
common law, so judges decide legal issues based on statutes and precedent.  
Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, U.S./Mexico Cross-Border Child Abduction – the Need for 
Cooperation, 29 N.M. L. REV. 289, 294 (1999). 
90   Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 445. 
91   An example of a customary rule of law is the concept of patria 
potestas in Mexico. See discussion infra, at Part IV.A. 
92   Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 445. 
93   2010 Compliance Report, supra note 18, at 22.  
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A. Custody Rights in Mexico 
In Mexico, the concept of patria potestad,94 translated to 
parental authority, is applied to the legal relationship between 
children and their parents.95  Exercising parental authority involves a 
duty of care and custody to the minor child.96  As Mexican courts 
apply this concept, custody of a child involves special care, attention, 
and love.97  Further, “[c]ustody cannot be understood separately from 
the physical supervision of the children, because that connection is a 
means to protect them, raise them . . . and provide for them.”98  
Parental authority is distinct from the physical custody of a child or 
an arrangement of visitation rights, however, because parental 
authority is inherent in the relationship between children and their 
parents.99 
Historically, parental authority referred to paternal power, so 
“a father had a near absolute right to his children, whom he viewed 
as chattel.”100  This natural right was viewed as so strong that courts 
were virtually “powerless” to interfere.101  Over time, however, 
Mexican courts began to subordinate the concept of parental 
authority to the best interests of the child.102 
Today, parental authority in Mexico is largely governed by the 
Civil Code,103 and “has evolved from an absolute power into a legal 
power.”104  Parental authority has slowly transformed into a joint 
                                                 
94   “Patria potestad” is Spanish for “parental authority.”  Patricia Begné, 
Symposium on Comparative Custody Law: North American Parental Authority and Child 
Custody in Mexico, 39 FAM. L.Q. 527, 527 (2005). 
95   Id. 
96   Id. at 533. 
97   Id. at 534. 
 
98   Id. 
99   Whallon v. Lynn, 230 F.3d 450, 453 (1st Cir. 2000). 
100   Kathryn Mercer, A Content Analysis of Judicial Decision-Making – How 
Judges use the Primary Caretaker Standard to Make a Custody Determination, 5 WM. & 
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 14 (1998). 
101   Id. 
102   Id. at 16. 
103   JOSÉ ANTONIO MÁRQUEZ GONZÁLEZ, FAMILY LAW IN MEXICO 80 
(Kluwer Law Int’l 2011).  
104   Begné, supra note 94, at 528. 
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responsibility between the father and mother.105  In divorce cases, 
both parents continue to exercise parental authority over the child,106 
unless this authority is legally terminated.107  Since Mexican family law 
courts are instructed to consider the best interests of the child in 
deciding custody arrangements,108 children are commonly placed with 
their mothers following a divorce.109  Only one to five of every one 
hundred fathers are awarded custody of their children.110 In fact, 
mothers are automatically awarded custody of children under age 
seven (and sometimes up to age twelve, depending on the state), 
unless the father proves that the mother poses a significant danger to 
the child’s development.111 
B. Custody Rights in the U.S. 
Similar to Mexico, the U.S. historically awarded custody rights 
to fathers, since children were considered the father’s property.112  In 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, states increasingly awarded 
custody based on the best interests of the child.113  As a result, 
mothers were often awarded custody of their children, especially in 
the case of young children.114 
Recently, the “maternal presumption” has lessened, and the 
legislature considers joint custody and uses a primary caretaker 
standard to determine the child’s best interests.115  Joint custody 
assumes that allowing a child to maintain relationships with both 
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parents is in the child’s best interests.116  The primary caretaker 
standard presumes that it is in the child’s best interest to live with 
whichever parent has provided continuous care.117  Despite 
movements toward these new standards, mothers are still awarded 
custody of their children more frequently than fathers.118  For 
example, in 2012, only 18.3 percent of custodial parents were 
fathers.119 
V.  HISTORY OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND 
MEXICO 
Mexico is the most popular destination for children abducted 
from the U.S., and vice versa.120  For example, in 2009, the USCA 
was involved with 558 cases in which American children were 
abducted to Mexico.121  Japan had the second largest number of 
active cases with thirty-eight.122  This phenomenon likely results from 
Mexico’s proximity to, and historical and cultural connections with, 
the U.S.123 Today, there are roughly 11.7 million individuals living in 
the U.S. who were born in Mexico, and Mexico-U.S. migration is the 
largest bi-national migration flow in the world.124 
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A. Mexico’s Compliance with the Hague Convention 
In recent years, the Department of State has found that 
Mexico has struggled to fulfill its obligations under the Hague 
Convention.125  For three consecutive years, Mexico was designated 
as a country exhibiting “patterns of noncompliance” because the 
Mexican Central Authority (MCA) was ineffective at locating 
abducted children and taking parents within Mexico.126  For example, 
in 2009, there were forty-seven cases of children abducted from the 
U.S. to Mexico, and the children were only located in thirteen of 
these cases.127 
In 2010, Mexico was labeled as “not compliant.”128  The 
USCA reported it “experienced serious difficulties” working with the 
MCA, causing left-behind parents to endure “costly inconvenience” 
and “significant delays” in processing return applications.129  For 
example, the USCA requested the MCA’s assistance in locating 
children involved in thirty-eight unresolved cases that had been 
pending for more than eighteen months, but the MCA failed to 
locate them “[i]n many of the cases.”130 
Three factors contribute to Mexico’s difficulties enforcing the 
Hague Convention.  First, Mexico has not enacted legislation, like 
ICARA in the U.S., to effectively implement the Convention.131  
Instead, this responsibility is reserved to the states.132  As a result, 
Congress unanimously adopted a resolution urging Mexico and other 
noncompliant countries “to ensure their compliance with the Hague 
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Convention by enacting effective implementing legislation and 
educating their judicial and law enforcement authorities.”133  Mexico, 
however, continues to enforce the Convention according to 
independent state law.134 
Second, Mexico does not have sufficient resources to locate 
abducted children and taking parents, or to educate officials and 
judges about the Convention’s procedures.135  For example, some 
Mexican judges continue to adjudicate cases arising under the 
Convention based on procedures found in state civil codes136 and the 
merits of the underlying custody dispute, which is inconsistent with 
the Convention.137  Instead, judges are supposed to assume the 
existing custody agreement from the child’s state of habitual 
residence is valid, and must return the child based on this 
agreement.138  Recently, Congress encouraged Mexico and other 
noncompliant countries to “further educate its central authority and 
local law enforcement authorities regarding the Hague 
Convention . . . and the need for immediate action when a parent of 
an abducted child seeks their assistance.”139 
Third, taking parents may file an “amparo,” a special appeal in 
which the taking parent claims that the government has violated a 
constitutional right.140  When an amparo is filed, the case is put on 
hold until a ruling on the amparo has been made.141  A ruling on an 
amparo may be appealed multiple times, resulting in costly delays to 
the left-behind parent.142 
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In an attempt to solve these problems, in 2008, the U.S. 
Embassy in Mexico City began working with the MCA “to persuade 
the Mexican branch of Interpol to apply more resources and effort to 
locate abducted children, and to educate the judiciary in an effort to 
increase understanding of the Convention.”143  Further, the MCA 
began working with the Agencia Federal de Investigación (AFI) in an 
effort to more efficiently locate abducted children.144  Finally, the 
MCA has also claimed that it has undertaken legislative initiatives to 
restrict the use of amparos in Hague return cases.145 
For the past three years, the Department of State has noted 
the MCA has made significant improvements in its enforcement of 
the Convention.146  Unfortunately, the MCA and Mexican law 
enforcement continue to experience difficulties locating abducted 
children because of inadequate staffing and other resources.147  
Mexican courts are also exceptionally slow in processing Hague 
return applications,148 and judges continue to adjudicate Hague return 
cases inconsistently.149  As a result, the number of unresolved return 
applications is increasing.150 
B. The U.S.’ Compliance with the Hague Convention 
Congress enacted ICARA to give effect to the Hague 
Convention in the U.S.151  The Act gives the Convention the force of 
law in the U.S., and imposes consequences, such as contempt, if the 
Convention is not complied with.152  ICARA and the Convention 
                                                 
143   Id. 
144   2011 Compliance Report, supra note 137, at 5. 
145   Id. 
146   Id. 
147   2010 Compliance Report, supra note 18, at 23. 
148   Id. at 22. 
149   Id. at 23. 
150   See generally 2011 Compliance Report, supra note 137. 
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serve “to deter international child abduction and to provide a 
mechanism for the prompt return of abducted children.”153 
Parts of ICARA, however, hinder operation of the 
Convention. For example, ICARA grants state and federal courts 
concurrent jurisdiction over all claims arising under the 
Convention.154  It is recommended that Hague Convention return 
cases be filed in federal court because “[f]ederal judges are 
considered . . . better equipped to [rule according to the Convention] 
as opposed to state court judges, who are accustomed to making best 
interests of the child determinations and who may be more inclined 
to do so in Hague Convention cases.”155  Consequently, a left-behind 
parent may engage in forum-shopping to obtain the most favorable 
venue to pursue his or her Hague return case, resulting in additional 
costs and delays.156 
The Department of States’ three most recent compliance 
reports do not include statistics analyzing the U.S.’ handling of 
incoming Hague Convention cases.157  Nonetheless, in 2009, there 
were 324 newly filed Convention applications involving 454 children 
that were abducted into the U.S.158  Of these 454 children, the U.S. 
only returned 154 of them to their country of habitual residence.159  
120 of these children were abducted from Mexico, and only fifty-
three were returned.160  Although the U.S. does not evaluate its own 
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performance, these numbers suggest that, despite ICARA, the U.S. 
also experiences difficulties enforcing the Convention. 
C.  Latin American Efforts to Promote Compliance with the 
Hague Convention 
In 2004, judges and Central Authorities from seventeen Latin 
American countries, Spain, and the U.S. met to discuss ways to 
improve regional operation of the Hague Convention.161  Officials 
concluded that cooperation with the Convention would require 
“[r]egular international meetings and contacts among Judges and 
Central Authorities for the purpose of exchanging information, ideas 
and good practice.”162  At follow-up meetings, officials recommended 
and developed “regional model law of procedure” to “facilitate 
national implementation of the [Convention].”163 
In 2011, officials from Latin American countries and 
organizations, Spain, and the U.S. met “to discuss how to improve, 
among the countries represented, the operation of the 
[Convention] . . . and to provide information on the implementation 
of the [Convention].”164  The meeting proposed to develop a 
“practical handbook” to assist judges in Hague proceedings, 
recommended limiting grounds for appeals to streamline 
proceedings, and emphasized the importance of communication 
between Central Authorities and judges.165  In theory, educating all 
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judges in every contracting state and encouraging communication 
between Central Authorities is a viable solution.  Streamlining these 
efforts and providing resources to facilitate the return of children will 
best serve the Convention’s goals. 
VI.  SOLUTIONS FOR ADDRESSING NONCOMPLIANCE BETWEEN THE 
U.S. AND MEXICO 
Compliance with the Hague Convention is critical for 
protecting abducted children.166  The Convention is often considered 
a “one-way street” for Americans.167  Left-behind parents from 
noncompliant countries benefit from the “almost certain” guarantee 
that children abducted into the U.S. will be returned, while American 
parents lack these same guarantees.168  In truth, the U.S. also has a 
meager track record for returning children.  Consequently, the 
Convention remains an empty promise for many left-behind parents.  
The U.S. and Mexico (and other contracting states) must ensure that 
abducted children are promptly returned to their custodial parent. 
A.  Educating Judges About Hague Return Cases 
Despite efforts to educate judges about Hague return cases, 
these cases are often decided inconsistently within a country and 
between countries.169  Judges are told to rule based on a broad 
interpretation of law, which includes the customary laws of the 
child’s state of habitual residence.170  Many judges also determine 
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family law issues according to the best interests of the child, but this 
may be inconsistent with the existing custody agreement.171 
Educating each judge in the U.S. and Mexico about the 
Hague Convention is a daunting task, particularly because many of 
these judges will never be assigned a Hague return case.  Ideally, 
providing a dedicated group of judges or courts would alleviate the 
problems associated with an inconsistent judiciary.  In the U.S., 
Congress may use its Article I powers “[t]o constitute tribunals 
inferior to the Supreme Court.”172  In Mexico, each state’s Congress 
has the power to create federal administrative courts.173  A court 
dedicated to Hague return cases would allow judges to become 
intimately familiar with the Convention and case law from other 
countries.174  As a result, Hague Convention return cases would be 
adjudicated consistently with the objectives of the Convention. 
B. Providing Adequate Financial Resources to Left-Behind Parents 
The U.S. does not provide adequate resources to left-behind 
parents.  The U.S. made a reservation175 to Article 26 of the Hague 
Convention.  Although making a reservation to Article 26 has not 
posed significant problems to other countries, it is a major source of 
delays in the U.S.176  The U.S. places the burden of paying for legal 
proceedings and attorneys solely on the left-behind parent, unless 
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these costs are covered by legal aid or assumed by pro bono 
attorneys.177  The legal aid system in the U.S., however, is under-
funded,178 and the availability of pro bono attorneys is decreasing, 
especially for family law-related claims.179 
The expenses of a Hague Convention return case extend 
beyond the legal proceedings.180  Despite the U.S. legal aid system’s 
lack of funds, the U.S. should be required to assist indigent left-
behind parents in these proceedings, since this benefits the abducted 
child and minimizes the time the child spends in an unfamiliar 
environment.  The United Kingdom, for example, has been 
successful in requiring its legal aid system to cover all legal costs to 
the extent it can bear.181  The U.S. could also require taking parents to 
cover the left-behind parents’ legal expenses, but this may not be 
feasible depending on the taking parent’s financial situation. 
C.  Providing Adequate Resources to Central Authorities 
Mexico does not provide adequate resources to the MCA to 
locate abducted children and taking parents.182  Although the MCA 
works with Interpol and AFI, the Authority still lacks the manpower 
and funds necessary to be effective, especially when the left-behind 
parent does not know the child’s exact location.183  Mexico’s lack of 
resources makes cooperation with the U.S. paramount. 
The USCA should limit using its resources to educate 
Mexican judges, the MCA, and law enforcement on Hague return 
cases.  Although the Department of State has noted recent 
improvements,184 the bulk of the MCA’s problems no longer result 
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from a lack of information.  Instead, the USCA should expend its 
resources in the form of manpower to assist the MCA and Mexican 
law enforcement in locating abducted children in Mexico. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Hague Convention lacks an enforcement mechanism to 
ensure that abducted children are promptly returned.  In many 
countries, the Convention is an empty promise for left-behind 
parents.  Although the U.S. enacted ICARA to implement the 
Convention, the U.S. has an unacceptable track record in returning 
abducted children.  The U.S. and Mexico must work together to 
ensure that children are promptly located and returned.  
Consequently, the U.S. and Mexico should create courts with judges 
dedicated to Hague Convention return cases to ensure consistency 
and accuracy in decisions.  The U.S. must provide financial assistance 
to left-behind parents, and Mexico and the U.S. must provide 
resources to the MCA to locate abducted children and taking parents.  
Under the current framework, the Convention fails to protect 
thousands of children and families every year.  We can do better.  
Our children deserve better. 
 
 
 
 
